INTRODUCTION
There is a considerable debate amongst the public, policymakers and academics as to whether individual executives matter for firm performance and behaviour. A growing body of research demonstrates that executive directors are a heterogeneous group and suggests that executive behaviour is governed by more than economic trade-offs. Studies have shown that executives affect the performance of firms (e.g., Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Bennedsen, PerezGonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2008; Custodio & Metzger, 2013; Kaplan, Klebano, & Sorensen, 2012) and their policy choices (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Custodio & Metzger, 2014; Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011) . Other studies argue that individual executives have little impact on firm performance and behaviour because seemingly unique executive-specific 'styles' may in fact be shaped by the board of directors and that new executives are appointed with desired characteristics to take a firm in the direction determined by the board (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2013) . This study sheds new light on whether and how executives matter by demonstrating that variations in observable demographic and experience characteristics of executives have market valuation effects.
With existing work mostly limited to non-financial firms, there is an inherent lack of analysis concerning the banking sector. Since banks are complex institutions and may require employees with specialised skills (Philippon & Reshef, 2012) , selecting the right executives could give banks a significant competitive edge as well as contribute to the growth of the economy. Recently, the banking sector has received much criticism for its contribution to the financial crisis that started in 2007. Many blame incompetent banking executives for engaging in activities that endangered the safety and soundness of the financial system and gave rise to unprecedented government support of the banking sector. By the same token, certain bank 2 executives have been credited with steering their organisations successfully through the financial crisis. 1 In this study, we focus on executive directors 2 who are responsible for the day-to-day running of the bank. Since executive directors have substantial discretion over their decisions, their individual characteristics such as prior experience could make an important difference to bank outcomes (e.g. Kim & Lu, 2014; Landier, Sauvagnat, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2013) . In contrast, non-executive directors, who are responsible for monitoring and advising the CEOs, are not involved in managing the bank on a daily basis. Hence, compared with non-executive directors, executives have more influence and their characteristics are more likely to have measurable implications for the market performance of banks.
We argue that executive characteristics such as age, education, and employment history are performance relevant. In our analysis, we examine whether the stock market reaction to the appointment of a new executive is driven by the characteristics of the appointee. Focusing on the appointment of a new executive offers an appropriate setting in which to examine the value of characteristics that the appointee brings to the hiring bank. In an efficient capital market, the market reaction is indicative of the anticipated future performance conditional on relevant information (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988) . Thus, market returns will be higher when an appointee with desirable characteristics is hired because investors believe that this appointee will improve performance. In this study, we do not look at internal appointments of executives because the identification of any causal effects between appointee characteristics and announcement returns are not straightforward in this case. From a resource-based perspective, the marginal addition in terms of human capital to the firm is likely to be smaller 3 when internal candidates (who, most likely, already contribute to bank decision-making in senior positions) are appointed compared to an externally appointed director.
Our sample consists of 252 executive appointment announcements by 145 US banks.
Exploring this dataset, we examine whether the stock market reaction to the appointment announcement is affected by seven characteristics of the appointee: (1) age, (2) gender, (3) the number of prior executive directorships, (4) the number of current non-executive directorships (busyness), (5) the number of non-banking industries (in which the appointee has experience), (6) an Ivy League education and (7) an MBA degree.
There are two main econometric challenges we face in our analysis. First, a bank's decision to make a top executive appointment could be driven by endogenous factors, e.g., when a bank is not performing well and faces shareholder pressure to improve performance by making new appointments (Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014; Fee et al., 2013) . We therefore exclude appointments where the press coverage indicates an appointment followed investor dissatisfaction with management or corporate strategy. The second challenge is that, since we are interested in the expected performance effects linked to a new appointment, our sample only contains single appointment announcements which involve external appointments (i.e., executives who have previously not worked for the sample bank). This might introduce a selection bias when the decision to make a single (rather than multiple) appointment announcement or the decision to choose an external (rather than an internal) appointee correlates with factors associated with announcement returns. We address this second challenge using the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure and the findings we report in this paper are robust to controlling for selection bias. 4 Our key findings are as follows. First, announcement returns following appointments are statistically positive, suggesting that the addition of top managers, on average, is valuable for US banks. Second, we examine whether the market reaction to executive appointments is influenced by characteristics of the executive. Overall, our findings suggest that the age, education and prior experience of the executives create shareholder wealth in the US banking sector. In contrast, gender, non-banking experience or an MBA degree do not lead to any measurable market returns. In addition, the appointment of executives who hold non-executive directorships with outside firm at the time of the appointment results in negative returns, consistent with the hypothesis that busy executives have less attention to focus on an individual bank (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006) .
Third, our analysis of interaction terms shows that the wealth effects linked to executive characteristics are moderated by how much influence the incoming executive is expected to hold over the bank. Thus, the expected performance effects of top executives are reduced as bank boards become more independent. By contrast, the expected performance effects are higher for CEOs, confirming that the CEO is the most important decision-maker in the bank.
Overall, our study makes three significant contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to a growing literature that uses manager fixed effects to address the question of how important executive 'styles' are to various corporate outcomes (Adams et al., 2005; Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Frank & Goyal, 2007; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012) . It is empirically challenging to quantify the effects of individual executives on firm performance. Fee et al. (2013) argue that executive turnover, which forms the empirical basis to work out executive styles, may frequently be endogenous (e.g., when they follow a period of underperformance Second, we provide direct empirical evidence on the value of top executive characteristics in the US banking sector. We are unaware of any published research that looks at the value of top executives in the banking sector. Since the banking sector is relatively opaque, complex and skill-intensive (Philippon & Reshef, 2012) , we contribute towards uncovering the 'black box' of desirable characteristics top corporate leaders should possess to affect performance in the banking sector. In addition, our findings add to the current debate on the value of generalist versus specialist managerial experience in banking. While many studies recognise the growing importance of general managerial experience (Custodio, Ferreira, & Matos, 2013; Lazear, 2004) , we show that cross-industry experience is not value-relevant to US bank shareholders.
Third, our paper contributes to the scant literature on governance inside the top management team. Despite the central roles CEOs and other executives play in managing the company, there are surprisingly few studies that focus on top executives (e.g., Berger et al., 6 2014; Landier et al., 2013; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011) . Recently, Kim and Lu (2014) show how strengthening board independence weakens executive suite independence, which is proxied by the fraction of executives appointed before the current CEO. We similarly focus on the interplay between the boards and top management teams and demonstrate that board independence weakens the expected performance effects linked to certain executive characteristics.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys major theoretical and empirical evidence and develops our primary hypotheses, followed by a section describing our sample and empirical strategy. We then present our empirical results and conclude the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical background
Much research in both non-financial and financial firms has devoted considerable attention to studying the board of directors. 3 For example, recent studies analyse the effects of board size on firm value (e.g., Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008) , the optimal balance between non-executive and executive directors (e.g., Dahya & McDonnell, 2007; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004) , the impact of board diversity on firm value (e.g., Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003) , or the value of firm-level governance practices (e.g., Van Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013; Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 2009) . There is also a stream of research that looks at the impact of gender diversity on firm performance (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Farrell & 1 Hersch, 2005; Rose, 2007; Singh, Vinnicombe & Johnson, 2001 ). In the banking industry, Adams and Mehran (2012) and Andres and Vallelado (2008) show some evidence that bank board structure is relevant for bank performance. (1) whether executives matter and (2) how executives matter.
Executive characteristics and bank performance
In this section, we explain how demographic and experience characteristics of executives affect the announcement returns. The characteristics we focus on are (1) age, (2) gender, (3) the number of prior executive directorships, (4) the number of current non-executive directorships 8 and (5) the number of non-banking industries (in which the executive has experience), (6) Ivy
League education and (7) MBA degree.
Age. The age of the appointees could impact their decision-making capability, risk-taking behaviour, career concerns and economic incentives. Compared to younger appointees, older ones have more experience in making decisions when they face complex and ambiguous tasks (Worthy, Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer -et al. 2011) . Furthermore, older appointees face less career uncertainty and have fewer incentives to improve their job security. Thus, they are less likely to engage in value-destroying excessively risky activities. For example, Yim (2013) shows that older CEOs are less likely to engage in M&A activities and tend to perform better. Hence, older appointees could create wealth for bank shareholders.
However, younger appointees have more energy and drive (Harman, 1991; Roberts & Rosenberg, 2006) . This could translate into other characteristics such as enthusiasm, decisiveness and ambition. In addition, compared to older appointees, younger ones have more ideas, are quicker in learning new technologies (Grund & Westergård-Nielsen, 2008) and are able to make innovative decisions. With these qualities, younger appointees may create shareholder wealth.
Gender. Female appointees possess unique skills, experience and networks, allowing them to contribute to the functional decision making capability of the bank. In addition, female appointees could counterbalance potentially excessive risk-taking behaviour by male colleagues.
For example, Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2014) (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009 ). This could impose psychic costs on the female executive, which could result in performance losses (Becker, 1957) .
Empirical results that attempt to link the presence of female executives to firm performance are mixed. For example, Lee and James (2007) find a significant negative stock market reaction to the news of female CEO appointments while Gupta and Raman (2013) find no gender-specific difference in the stock reactions to the news of the CEO appointment or in the post-appointment operating performance of firms. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that for firms with good corporate governance standards in place, more gender-diverse boards are negatively associated with firm performance.
Prior executive directorships experience. It is possible that there is a unique set of skills and managerial abilities acquired by those with prior executive directorships that sets them apart from other individuals (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Hence, holding prior executive directorships in listed firms signals the appointee's proven track record and accomplishments. In addition, experienced appointees also bring their existing social ties and networks to the bank.
This places the bank in the networks of other firms, giving it access to various external constituencies such as industry regulators (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000) . Looking at diversifying M&A, Custodio and Metzger (2013) show that when the acquirer's CEO has prior experience working in the target industry, acquirer's abnormal announcement returns are higher than those generated by a CEO without similar experience.
Current non-executive directorships (busyness).
The appointment of an executive with non-executive directorships could give the bank 'endorsement benefits', allowing it access to corporate elites and external resources (Fich, 2005; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011) .
However, appointees holding non-executive directorships can be distracted from their responsibilities at the bank (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006 ).
They might not have the time and energy to fulfil their duties. Multiple directorships have been associated with lower board inputs from busy directors (Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt, & Ning, 2009 ). Bar-Hava, Gu and Lev (2013) show that when busy directors resign from one of the board positions, investors of firms which the directors continue to serve react positively to the news.
Finally, examining US commercial banks, Grove, Patelli, Victoravich and Xu (2011) show that the proportion of busy directors has a weak inverted-U relationship with bank performance.
Experience in non-banking industries. Several studies suggest that general skills acquired through experience in a diversified set of industries are becoming increasingly important and value-adding (e.g. Cremers & Grinstein, 2013; Lazear, 2004) . This allows appointees to make a variety of decisions in different contexts. However, as the banking industry is highly specialised, appointees with experience in multiple non-banking industries might have fewer specialist financial skills and thus, might be less capable of making technical decisions. (Farnum, 1990) . Since conflicts of social preference can impose psychic costs on team members and lower overall group performance (Becker, 1957) , the presence of Ivy League educated appointees could destroy shareholder wealth.
MBA degree. One well-documented benefit of an MBA degree is the extensive social links that the appointees form during their MBA study. Appointing executives with an MBA degree could place the hiring bank in a more central position in the corporate social networks, and this could create value for bank shareholders.
However, there is no clear empirical evidence suggesting that MBA executives outperform non-MBA ones. For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that hedge fund managers with an MBA degree do not perform significantly better than those without one.
Furthermore, McCabe, Butterfield and Trevino (2006) show that self-reported cheating is higher in MBA program than in other graduate programs. Since individuals who cheat at school also tend to cheat in the workplace (Nonis & Swift 2001) , MBA executives might be more likely to commit wrongdoing during their tenure at the bank. This could destroy shareholder wealth because the losses associated with corporate fraud can be enormous (Karporff, Lee, & Martin, 2008 ).
12
Overall, there are arguments for both positive and negative effects linked to the executive characteristics we discuss above. Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical question to see whether the director characteristics have positive or negative effects on shareholder wealth.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY Data
We examine new appointments of executives to US banks from January 1999 to December 2011.
We start by obtaining a list of all banks on BoardEx, a leading business intelligence service that provides information on executive characteristics. BoardEx covers in excess of 700 US banks which is far more than other similar databases which track executives over time, allowing us to also include smaller banks into our sample. Recently, several studies have used BoardEx to obtain director-level data. We then use Factiva to search for newspapers articles containing the search terms related to executives ('officer', 'executive' etc.) and appointments ('appoint', 'name' etc.) . To avoid missing appointment events, we keep our search terms generic and avoid using specific terms such as 'executive director'. As in Custodio and Metzger (2013) , we retain appointments to executive positions including CEO, CFO, COO, CRO, CIO, Chairman, President, Division CEO, Division President, Division Chairman, Head of Division, Regional CEO, Regional President, and Regional Chairman. Some of our executive appointments are simultaneously board appointments. This is the case for most CEO appointments and for a limited number of President or COO appointments. Since investors could react differently to appointments that mix the hiring 13 of a new executive with board appointments, we will deal with this possibility in subsequent sections.
The event date is defined as the earliest trading day when the announcement is made. In the final sample, we impose two exclusion criteria to ensure that the stock market reaction is purely driven by the event of the incoming executive appointment. First, we remove all appointment announcements that are simultaneously announced with other corporate events (e.g.
earnings or merger announcements) because the stock market reactions might be confounded by the other news items in these cases. Second, we exclude all appointment announcements that are made simultaneously with announcements of unplanned executive departures. We exclude these announcements, because the stock market reaction to this type of event might be driven by the predecessor's unplanned departure rather than by the incoming executive appointment. Planned departures (that is, previously announced executive departures due to retirement) are kept in the sample. 5 We also remove appointment announcements where appointee information cannot be retrieved from BoardEx and where daily stock returns are not available from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We then cross-check each announcement with information disclosed in BoardEx and in the bank's financial reports to verify the accuracy of the information.
This generates a set of 658 executive appointment announcements by 308 banks. Our 658 appointment announcements are classified into three categories: (1) single appointment announcements of externally-hired executives (252 cases), (2) single appointment announcements of internally-promoted executives (271 cases), and (3) appointment announcements where two or more executives are simultaneously appointed (135 cases).
14 Our sample of interest consists of single and externally-hired appointment announcements. While differences in the announcement effects for externally-versus internallyhired directors are an interesting research question, this is beyond the scope of the present study.
In this study, we restrict our sample to externally-hired executives to enable us to unambiguously measure the marginal value effect linked to the inclusion of new executives. Compared to an externally appointed director, the marginal addition in terms of human capital to the firm is likely to be smaller when internal candidates who already contribute to bank decision-making are appointed. Similarly, we cannot separate the announcement effects linked to individual executives when multiple executives are simultaneously appointed. However, focusing solely on external appointments could introduce a selection bias when banks choose to make external appointments over types of appointments. We will deal with this potential selection bias in subsequent sections. Table 1 summarises our classification of 658 executive appointment announcements.
- Table 1 about here
We obtain data on appointee characteristics from BoardEx. We first include two basic demographic measures: AGE measures the age of the appointee at the time of the appointment and FEMALE is a dummy that that equals to 1 if the appointee is a female and 0 otherwise. Second, we include three variables that capture the appointee experience and competitiveness in the external labour market: #EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIPS measures the number of executive directorships with listed firms that the appointee has held prior to joining the bank.
BUSYNESS measures the number of non-executive directorships the appointee holds at the time of the appointment. #NON-BANKING INDUSTRIES measures the number of non-banking 15 industries (based on 4-digit SIC codes) the appointee has worked in prior to joining the bank.
Finally, we include two variables that capture executive educational background: IVY LEAGUE is a dummy that equals 1 if the appointee obtains at least one degree from Ivy League institutions and 0 otherwise and MBA is a dummy that equals 1 if the appointee possesses an MBA degree and 0 otherwise.
Empirical strategy
Our main purpose is to investigate how market investors evaluate appointee characteristics using the stock market reactions to executive appointments. Since our approach is to employ only single appointment announcements involving appointees external to the bank, we face two main challenges.
First, the bank decision to make an executive appointment could be driven by endogenous factors, e.g., when it is not performing well and faces shareholder pressures to improve its performance by making new appointments (Berger et al., 2014; Fee et al., 2013) . The stock market reaction to such appointments, therefore, could be driven by investor satisfaction with the bank decision to take action rather than the performance effects linked to a new appointment. Since we are interested in examining how appointee characteristics are evaluated by market investors, we exclude appointment announcements that are made because the bank is not performing well. We rely on the contents provided in the press coverage to judge whether an appointment is made due to poor performance. In particular, if there is information indicating that the appointment is made because the bank is facing 'disappointing performance' or trying to 'seek a turnaround' for example, we do not include such appointment announcements in our sample. 16 The second challenge is that using only the sample of single and externally-hired executive appointment announcements might introduce a selection bias. This happens when the decision to make a single external appointment correlates with factors which also explain the announcement returns. For example, if underperforming banks are more likely to make single external appointment announcements and this causes negative returns, then ignoring this possibility will bias our estimates.
By observing single external appointments jointly with other appointment types (i.e., multiple executive appointments and single, internal executive appointments), we are able to address this problem using the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. In the first step, we construct a probit model to estimate the probability that the bank will make a single and externally-hired executive appointment announcement. We let a dummy variable be equal to 1 if the bank makes a single external announcement and 0 otherwise. The value of q would be determined by: q = *Z +  where Z contains appointee-level and bank-level variables that may influence the bank's decision to make a single and externally-hired appointment. The predicted individual probabilities obtained in the probit model are then used to calculate the inverse Mill's ratio for inclusion in the second-stage model as an additional explanatory variable (Heckman, 1979) .
Essentially, this procedure allows us to take into account the potential selection bias when banks choose to make a single external appointment instead of other appointment types. In the secondstep, we estimate the following regression model to examine the effects of appointee characteristics on the announcement returns:
5-day CAR (%) = α + β 1 appointee characteristics + β 2 control variables + β 3  ) (
The second-step regression can now be updated by including the term
is the inverse Mill's ratio (Heckman, 1979) . The dependent variables are 5-day CAR (%) around the announcement of a single externally-hired executive appointment. Appointee characteristics measures are defined as previously. Control variables refer to a set of variables that we include to ensure that our results on appointee characteristics are robust to the inclusion of these variables in the regression. We cluster standard errors at the bank-level.
The Heckman procedure requires us to identify an instrument in the form of a variable that influences the first step (the probability that a bank makes a single external appointment),
but not the second-step (the appointment announcement CARs). We use the natural logarithm of the distance from the bank's headquarter to an international airport as an instrument (see Adams,
Akyol and Verwijmeren (2013) for a detailed discussion of this instrument). The economic rationale behind this instrument is that banks with better access to a good talent pool are more likely to hire externally. Furthermore, holding all else constant, better-located banks are more attractive to talented executives and this could motivate them to move to work for the bank.
Thus, these banks are less constrained in choosing executives and are more likely to hire externally. In addition, other than affecting the bank's access to local director pool, there is no reason to believe that this instrument would affect the announcement returns to director appointment. Thus, we postulate that this is a suitable instrument for our model.
DETERMINANTS OF SINGLE & EXTERNALLY-HIRED EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS
We first study the characteristics of appointees and banks that make single and externally-hired executive appointments. Our model reports the probit estimates where the dependent variable 18 equals 1 if banks make a single external executive appointment and 0 otherwise. This analysis is estimated over the population of appointment announcements (which includes our sample of single appointment announcements of externally-hired executives as well as single appointment announcements of internally-promoted executives and appointment announcements where multiple executives are appointed to executive and board positions).
The explanatory variables we include are appointee-level and bank-level variables.
Appointee-level variables are the seven appointee characteristics defined as previously. We then include bank-specific variables, including bank size, which is the natural logarithm of the bank total assets (BANKSIZE); charter value, which is the ratio between the market value of equity and book value of equity (CHARTERVALUE); bank liabilities, which is the ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity (LEVERAGE). We further control for bank portfolio risk using the ratio of risk-weighted assets to the book value of total assets (PORTFOLIO RISK). We also control for the prior bank performance using an accounting-based performance measure:
return on assets (ROA), which is the ratio of net income to total assets. All bank-specific We also include a set of bank governance variables that could have significant impacts on the probability of banks making a single external appointment. We include board characteristics, such as the total number of executive and non-executive directors on the board (BOARDSIZE), the proportion of non-executive directors on the board (BOARDIND), and whether the CEO is also a chairman (DUALITY financial crisis (POST_CRISIS). Table 2 shows the summary statistics and variable definitions. Table 2 about here Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations between the variables. Table 3 about here Table 4 presents the results of the first-stage probit regression. Consistent with our expectations, column 3 of table 4 shows that the natural logarithm of distance to a major airport is negatively related to the likelihood of single external appointments (Column 3: = -0.22, p< .001) confirming its statistical validity as an instrument. In terms of appointee-level variables, the probability of a single external appointment is higher when the appointees possess an Ivy League education (Column 1: =0.30, p< .10). This could be because, in deciding between different potential candidates, banks tend to look for an unambiguous signal of competence. An Ivy League education could easily allow one candidate to stand out from other candidates. In addition, a single external appointment is more likely to include appointees with an MBA degree (Column 1: =0.50, p< .001) and is less likely to include those having prior executive directorship experience (Column 1: = -0.38, p< .001). Table 4 about here report that external CEO succession is much less common than internal CEO succession in the banking industry.
In essence, along with appointee-level characteristics, bank-level characteristics differ systematically for firms that make the single external appointments contained in our sample as opposed to other types of appointments. Therefore, not accounting for these differences could bias our estimates of the expected performance effects linked to director appointments.
EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Event study methodology
We use event study methodology to examine the stock market reactions to single and externallyhired appointment announcements (N=252). Following prior studies on executive appointments, we concentrate on the time period immediately surrounding the appointment announcement.
Specifically, we estimate the following market model:
where R it are the daily stock returns for firm i at day t and R mt are equally-weighted CRSP index return for day t. We estimate the model parameters using 255 daily return observations starting 21 from 300 to 46 days before the executive announcement date. We specify that there is no other executive appointment made during this estimation period. For robustness, we also use a different estimation period (-146, -46 ) and a different market benchmark (Datastream All US Banks Index). We construct abnormal returns as the sum of the prediction errors of the market model. To test for the statistical significance of the abnormal returns (ARs) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), we run the Patell-Z test and the Wilcoxon sign-ranked test. Table 5 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding single and externally-hired executive appointment announcements. CARs are calculated for two-, three-, four-and five-day event windows from day -1 to 0, 0 to +2, 0 to +3 and 0 to +4 (0 is the appointment date). The choice of event windows is motivated from the observation that the appointee is new to investors. Hence, investors require time to do their research on the appointee before they could accurately evaluate the appointee's impact on bank performance. Thus, this is likely to take a couple of days until a reliable and market price-moving assessment can be made. Table 5 shows that the stock market reaction to the appointment news, on average, is positive.
Event study results
Two-day (-1, 0), three-day (0, +2), four-day (0, +3) and five-day (0, +4) CARs are +0.71%, +0.31%, +0.47% and +0.99%, respectively. We observe that shorter event windows such as twoday (-1, 0) or three-day (0, +2) are not statistically significant while longer event window of (0, +4) is significant (at 5% level for mean and median significance tests). Hence, this validates our expectation that there is a lag in the stock market reaction to the appointment news.
----------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here ----------------------------------22
Although the average CAR is positive, CARs are not always positive. For example, 118 out of 252 executive appointments (46.8%) are associated with negative returns over 5-day window. Therefore, the next sections of this paper will investigate the determinants of stock market reactions to single and externally-hired executive announcements.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Appointee characteristics and appointment announcement returns
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the announcement effects and various appointee characteristics. The dependent variables are CAR of 5-day window (0, +4) around the announcement of an executive appointment. Appointee characteristics measures are defined as previously. We include a set of control variables identical to those in Table 4 to ensure that our results on appointee characteristics are robust to the inclusion of these variables in the regression. Table 6 shows the results of our second-stage regressions against 5-day CAR (%). In columns 1, 3, 6 and 8, we show that the stock market returns are positively and significantly related to three appointee characteristics: (1) age, (2) number of executive directorships, and (3) Ivy League education. The magnitude for each of the coefficient estimates is generally consistent across columns. The coefficient estimates indicate that CARs are on average 1.2% higher when the appointee is 10 years older, 1.4% higher when the appointee has one prior executive directorships position and 3.5% higher when the appointee has an Ivy League education.
----------------------------------
Insert Table 6 
about here ----------------------------------
With respect to age (Column 1: =0.12, p< .10), among several possible explanations, we argue that younger appointees have more incentives to increase their job security by engaging in risky 23 and value-destroying activities. Thus, market investors react less favourably to the appointment of a young appointee because they envisage that this appointment will impose an additional agency cost to the bank.
The positive coefficient estimates for number of executive directorships (Column 3:
=1.36, p< .05) demonstrate that prior experience performing functional tasks as a top executive equips the appointee with the most relevant expertise and skills to excel in the new job (Gary & Nowland, 2013) . We obtain similar estimation results when narrowing the definition of 'executive directorships' to 'CEO directorships'.
Columns 2, 5, 7 and 8 show that stock market returns are not affected by three executive characteristics: (1) being female, (2) number of non-banking industries, and (3) having an MBA degree.
6 Thus, our findings suggest that the gender of the executive does not matter, in the eyes of investors, for their future performance in the bank. However, our insignificant results should be interpreted with caution. It is plausible that there is information leakage surrounding the appointment of executives, particularly around the appointment of high-profile female appointments. Prior to the announcement, there could be speculation about the potential candidates and their chances of being appointed. If this is the case, the appointment news would not come as a surprise to market investors, which could explain the lack of a reaction on the announcement date. Thus, information leakage could undermine the statistical significance of some of our estimation coefficients.
Columns 4 and 8 show that the coefficient estimates for busyness are statistically significant and negative (Column 4: = -3.27, p< .01). The magnitude of the coefficient is economically large, indicating that CARs are 3.27% lower for each additional non-executive 24 directorship the appointee holds. Hence, investors expect banks appointing busy executives to perform significantly worse than those appointing more committed executives.
The coefficients on the control variables generally have the expected signs. BOARDIND is positive and significant (Column 2: = 10.60, p< .05), implying that the board makes better executive appointment decisions when it is highly independent. Announcement returns are also higher when the banks perform well as indicated by ROA (Column 2: = 1.27, p< .10). By contrast, CHARTER VALUE is statistically negative (Column 2: = -2.07, p< .01), demonstrating that investors react more positively to single and externally-hired appointments when the bank growth rate is low. Thus, investors expect the externally-hired executive to bring new perspectives and ideas and improve the bank growth opportunities.
Another interesting finding is that LAMBDA is statistically positive in several specifications (e.g. Column 2: = 7.53, p< .001). Lambda controls for selection bias caused by a bank's decision to make a single external appointment (rather than a different type of appointment). The positive coefficient on LAMBDA implies that the factors motivating banks to make a single external executive appointment correlate with positive announcement returns and that results not controlling for this will be biased.
Alternative specifications and robustness checks
We repeat the regression analysis in column 8 of Table 6 using different event-study specifications. Column 1 of Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates using a 4-day event window (0, +3). Column 2 uses a shorter estimation period of (-146, -46) 
and column 3 uses Datastream
All US Banks Index (BANKSUS) as an alternative benchmark to calculate abnormal returns.
Columns 1-3 show that our estimation results are similar to those of the previous section.
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Overall, our findings are insensitive to choices of event windows, estimation periods and benchmark types. Table 7 about here ----------------------------------Furthermore, although the text contained in the appointment announcements made by banks are standardised, the text in a few announcements might go beyond simply announcing the new executive. For example, one announcement in our sample explains that a new chief risk officer is appointed because the bank is currently battling with regulatory authorities and needs to improve its image after a scandal. Therefore, the stock market reactions could be interspersed with information other than those related to the new appointee. We exclude 10 such announcements and redo the analysis we did in column 8 of Table 6 . 7 As column 4 of Table 7 shows, our new coefficient estimates are similar to those obtained previously. In addition, as some of the banks appear several times in our working sample, we add bank fixed-effects into our model. Column 5 shows that our results remain qualitatively similar to those obtained earlier.
----------------------------------Insert
To show that the estimation results we obtain in Table 6 are non-random, we run a placebo test during a 3-day event window (-15, -13) . Since this event window is before the appointment announcement date, we expect none of the main coefficient estimates to take significant values. Column 6 of Table 7 confirms this expectation. This shows that the results we obtain in our main analysis in Table 6 are indeed driven by the event of the incoming executive appointment.
Does board independence moderate the market valuation of executive characteristics?
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In Table 8 , we examine whether the proportion of non-executive directors (BOARDIND)
influences the market evaluation of appointee characteristics. More non-executive directors on the board implies more monitoring pressure on the top executives. Thus, a board with more nonexecutive directors could inhibit executive influence and, thus, diminish the expected performance effects linked to the appointee characteristics. To verify this, we include several interaction terms which are the products of executive characteristics and the proportion of nonexecutive directors, such as BOARDIND*AGE into our regression model.
Panel A of Table 8 shows that board independence has a statistically negative effect on investor evaluation of (1) Ivy League education (= -6.54, p< .05), (2) #executive directorships (= -7.12, p< .05) and (3) number of non-banking industries (in which the executive has experience) (= -21.78, p< .10). Although insignificant, board independence also exerts a negative effect on investor evaluation of executive's age.
----------------------------------Insert Table 8 about here ----------------------------------
To further investigate whether board independence diminishes the wealth effects of executive characteristics, we construct an F-test, the results of which are displayed in Panel B of Table 8 . Our results demonstrate that the more a board is dominated by non-executive directors, market returns become less affected by characteristics of the executive. This is consistent with the prediction that non-executive directors act as monitors to inhibit top executive discretion and influence. Thus, when the level of influence of the incoming executive is diminished, their characteristics become less relevant to investors. Consequently, in a highly independent board, the positive wealth effects of executive characteristics disappear. 27 Overall, we argue that executives are valuable for shareholders except when the board of directors is highly independent. In such cases, executives become value irrelevant.
Are CEOs different?
In Table 9 , we examine whether the CEO dummy (CEOPOST) influences the market evaluation of appointee characteristics. In our sample of executive appointment announcements, we mix CEOs with other executives such as CFOs or CROs. Because the CEO is the most important decision maker in the bank, investors might value CEO characteristics differently from those of lower-ranked executives. Thus, we include several interaction terms which are the products of appointee characteristics and CEO dummy, such as CEOPOST*AGE into our regression model.
Panel A of Table 9 shows that CEOPOST has a positive effect on investor evaluation of:
(1) Ivy League education (= 3.77, p< .05) and (2) number of executive directorships (=1.59, p< .05). This implies that market investors place additional reward on talented and experienced CEOs relative to other executives. By contrast, CEOPOST has a negative effect on investor evaluation of (3) busyness (= -10.45, p< .001). Consequently, investors place an additional value cost on a CEO who is busy holding too many non-executive directorships. Thus, we observe a negative interaction term. Table 9 about here
To further investigate the wealth effects of CEO characteristics, we construct another Ftest in Panel B of Table 9 . Panel B shows that the wealth effects of all characteristics are enhanced when the appointee joins as a CEO. In essence, our results show that, in the case of 28 CEOs, investors value desirable characteristics more and penalise undesirable characteristics more.
Finally, some appointment announcements entail the appointee also being appointed to the board of directors. This happens in most CEO appointments and in some President appointments. Since we have already found stronger wealth effects linked to CEO appointment, we examine whether hiring mixed with board appointment to non-CEO positions also causes larger valuation effects. Overall, the interaction coefficients are insignificant, implying that investors do not place additional value on this appointment type. For brevity, we do not report the results.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our paper investigates the value of executives to shareholders of US banks by examining the stock market reaction to the appointment of new executives. Our argument is that if executives are valuable to shareholders, announcement returns will be higher when executives with certain desirable characteristics are appointed to a bank. We employ an event study to compute the expected performance gains linked to executive characteristics such as age, education and experience.
Using a hand-collected of 252 executive appointments from 1999 to 2011, we demonstrate that certain executive characteristics create shareholder wealth. In particular, we show that market returns are higher when the appointee is older, has prior experience as an executive director or holds an Ivy League degree. By contrast, the appointment of an executive who holds multiple non-executive directorships results in negative returns. In addition, the 29 gender of the appointee and experience in non-banking industries do not affect stock market returns around the announcement of a new executive.
More importantly, we show that the level of influence that the appointee is expected to exert on the bank moderates the value which shareholders attach to appointee characteristics. We first document that the wealth effects disappear or diminish substantially the higher the proportion of non-executive directors. This implies that increased board monitoring and involvement in board decision making of non-executive directors reduces the influence of the incoming executive and therefore diminishes any wealth effects linked to their appointment. In addition, our findings demonstrate that the wealth effects are enhanced when the appointee joins as a CEO, consistent with the view that the CEO is the most important decision maker in the bank.
Overall, our study complements existing literature on why and how individual executives matter for firm performance. Our re 8 sults stress the crucial role of the nominating committee, which is responsible for searching and hiring directors (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999) . Our results also have important policy implications. First, we echo de Haan and Vlahu (2013) that appointing more executives with expertise to the bank is an important policy concern. Our findings are consistent with calls by policy makers to appoint more executives that are highly qualified and possess relevant industry experience. Second, our study does not show that the expected performance effects linked to executives vary by gender. Since it is plausible that there is information leakage surrounding the appointment of high-profile female executives, it is difficult to rely on the event study results to conclude whether increasing the proportion of female executives will affect bank performance. Therefore, our results also highlight the difficulty in using event study evidence in the debate concerning gender diversity. Since investors are already aware of the retirement of the outgoing executive, we argue that the stock market reactions to planned retirement announcements are purely driven by the joining event of the incoming executive 6 Table 3 indicates a high correlation of 0.56 between the number of non-banking industries and number of current non-executive directorships (busyness). Thus, in column 8, we exclude the number of prior non-banking industries to prevent the problem of multicollinearity.
7 Among the excluded announcements, two contain political sentiments and eight point out the specific rationale behind the appointment. The rationales include: stabilising bank operations (two cases), improving bank image after the scandal (one case), making aggressive expansion into a new product market or geographical area (five cases).
TABLE 1 Sample distribution
This table reports the composition of the sample of 658 announcements of executive appointments to 308 US banks between 01 January 1999 and 31 December 2011. Based on the information provided in the newspapers announcements, we classify the appointment announcements into three categories: (1) single and externally-hired appointment announcements, (2) single and internally-promoted appointment announcements, and (3) multiple executive appointment announcements. For clarity, we further classify 252 single and externally-hired appointment announcements into joining announcements and joining mixed with planned retirement announcements.
Number
Single and externally-hired appointment announcements Joining announcements of the incoming executives 201
Joining mixed with planned retirement announcements 51 252
Single and internally-promoted appointment announcements 271
Multiple appointment announcements All internal candidates 99
At least one external candidate 36 135
All 658 
TABLE 4 Probit estimates of probability of single and externally-hired appointments
This table estimates the likelihood that the bank is going to make single and externally-hired appointments. This analysis is estimated over the full sample of 658 executive appointment announcements, including single and externally-hired appointment announcements (our sample of interest), single and internally-promoted appointment announcements, and multiple executive appointment announcements. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals to 1 if the bank makes a single and externally-hired appointment. Year fixed-effects are included. All other variables are defined in Table 2 . t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to the announcements of single and externally-hired executive appointments. The dependent variables of all models are 5-day CAR (%). POST_CRISIS equals to 1 if year is 2008-2011 and 0 otherwise. LAMBDA represents the inverse Mill's ratio of the first stage probit regression that estimates the likelihood of the bank making a single externallyhired executive appointment announcement. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. All other variables are defined in Table 2 . t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to the announcements of single and externally-hired appointments for different specifications. Column 1 reports the coefficient estimates for an alternative event window of (0, +3). Column 2 reports the coefficient estimates for an alternative estimation period of (-146, -46) . Column 3 reports the coefficient estimates using an alternative benchmark of Datastream US banks Index (BANKSUS). Column 4 excludes announcements that contain sentiments. Column 5 adds bank fixed-effects into our model. Column 6 performs a placebo regression on event window (-15, -13) . Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. t-statistics are reported in brackets. For brevity, we do not show the control variables. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to announcements of single and externally-hired appointments. The dependent variables of all models are 5-day CAR (%). CHARACTERISTIC refers to the appointee characteristic shown in the column specification. BOARDIND is the proportion of non-executive directors on a board. LAMBDA represents the inverse Mill's ratio of the first stage probit regression that estimates the likelihood of the bank making a single externally-hired executive appointment announcement. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. t-statistics are reported in brackets. For brevity, we do not show the control variables. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to announcements of single and externally-hired appointments. The dependent variables of all models are 5-day CAR (%). CHARACTERISTIC refers to the appointee characteristic shown in the column specification. CEOPOST equals to 1 if the appointee is appointed to a CEO position and 0 otherwise. LAMBDA represents the inverse Mill's ratio of the first stage probit regression that estimates the likelihood of the bank making a single externally-hired executive appointment announcement. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. t-statistics are reported in brackets. For brevity, we do not show the control variables. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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